

STATEMENT BY THE GSLP/LIBERAL OPPOSITION 83/2006
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The La Linea Professor of Sociology Salustiano del Campo chose to make a speech about Gibraltar yesterday on the occasion of his being given an honorary doctorate by the University of Cadiz.

Normally, the distinguishing feature of sociologists is their scientific objectivity when expressing views about territories, peoples or situations, which is a reflection of their academic competence. Sr del Campo displayed an incredible level of ignorance and a transparent political bias totally incompatible with scientific objectivity. One can only suppose, therefore, that rather than being for service to the furtherance of science, the doctorate is being granted for furtherance of the Spanish claim to Gibraltar.

If the remarks were being made by a sociologist from the north of Spain, one could at least excuse it on the basis of a lack of knowledge of the reality of what Gibraltar is, but coming from a person born and bred in la Linea it is totally inexcusable.

Giving a historical analysis, the distinguished Professor concludes that the loss of sovereignty over 300 years ago became for Spain a cause which in conscience they had to pursue, although history has shown the difficulty because the recovery of Spanish sovereignty has not yet been achieved, notwithstanding the many attempts that have been made.

The Opposition considers that what the Professor should realize is precisely that the 300 years of history proves that it is a cause that will never, ever be achieved and that Gibraltar will never be Spanish again.

The Professor then goes on to praise the Castiella initiative at the United Nations in what he describes as intelligent response by Spain and a well-fought diplomatic battle, claiming that this led to a resolution in 1965 under which the UN determined that the principle of the re-integration of Gibraltar into Spain and not the right to self-determination should be applied.

This is a complete invention on the part of the Professor and is totally incompatible with giving credence to his expertise in historical research. The resolution passed by the General Assembly on 16 December 1965 invited the Governments of the UK and Spain to begin without delay the talks envisaged under the terms of the consensus adopted by the Committee of 24 in 1964. It makes no reference to the principle of the territorial re-integration and indeed no such principle exists in the annals of the UN.

The 1964 consensus is one that starts off by saying that the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial territories and peoples was fully applicable to the people and the territory of Gibraltar. This is in fact a consensus which does the opposite of what Salustiano del Campo claims. It upholds the basis of Gibraltar's case for self-determination. The Consensus, however,

acknowledges what was obvious in 1964 and continues to be obvious 42 years later, that there is a disagreement between the UK and Spain, and it invited them to discuss that disagreement and nothing else.

The Professor considers that the policy of Fernando Maria Castiella, the fascist architect of the blockade of Gibraltar, was coherent because it offered the Gibraltarians a special status with the widest possible level of autonomy, the right to have their own institutions and choose their own nationality as well as other rights and privileges. All these wonderful benefits, in the eyes of the Professor, were the proposals that the Gibraltarians rejected in the 1967 referendum with a vote of 12,138 to 44.

The Professor explains that the proposals had been carefully thought out and that the closure of the frontier formed part of this complex and well planned strategy, but that it went wrong and eventually became discredited. He blames the failure of the Spanish strategy principally on disagreement among Spaniards themselves and seems totally oblivious to the frontal opposition of the Gibraltarian people and of overwhelming backing from British public opinion for the right of the Gibraltarians to determine their own future.

Through his brief and distorted picture of the history of the dispute, he argues that the Lisbon agreement of 1980 and the Brussels agreement of 1984 were two more examples of initiatives that contributed nothing to the cause of Spain. He then considers that the airport agreement of the 1987 being the result of these two and other incoherent approaches would, if implemented, have resulted in Spain having to use an airport built on Spanish land without controlling it and without having given permission for its construction in the first place. He adds that paradoxically, the Gibraltarians were the ones who rejected it. Presumably he is arguing that in rejecting it we did Spain a favour and he would expect any successor to the 1987 agreement to be even more favourable to Spain than the previous attempt.

The Professor makes the point, however, that the present tripartite initiative should not be permitted to result in an airport which can be used from Spain, but which will not have representation of the Spanish authorities in its running and would in fact be giving approval to a British military airport on soil the sovereignty of which Spain will never renounce.

Once again we have an example of how within Spain the objective remains unchanged, which is to take over Gibraltar and the only debate is about the methodology that would be more effective in achieving this result.

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